FTSE Russell Insights

Taking aim at the "Magnificent Seven" US stocks through style investing and capping

Richard Ng

Senior Manager, Index Research & Design

Leon Roisenberg

Senior Manager, Index Research & Design
  • The current market concentration from the “Magnificent Seven” exceeds the record levels from the Dot Com Bubble and Global Financial Crisis. They have delivered strong returns - but some market participants expect a mean reversion.
  • The “Magnificent Seven” are Growth stocks in terms of Style and Quality in terms of Factor. Backdrops are different in various periods but Value outperformed post the Dot Com Bubble and the previous top seven stocks went separate paths post Bubble.
  • Russell Style Indexes give investors the ability to express their view on the “Magnificent Seven,” while capped indexes can alleviate concentration.

Seven mega-cap Technology and Consumer Discretionary stocks, Amazon, Apple, Google (Alphabet), Meta, Microsoft, Nvidia and Tesla, dubbed the “Magnificent Seven”, led the US equity market in 2023 due to an AI boom amid a stabilizing economy. They  have contributed around 94% of the Russell 1000 Index return YTD as of end of October. This dominance resulted in a very concentrated market with the “Magnificent Seven” comprising over 25% of Russell 1000 Index weight, the highest in recent history.

To get a sense of how concentrated the current market is, we look at the Herfindahl index using Russell 1000 to represent the US large cap stock market. The Herfindahl index can range from close to 0 to 10000, with lower values indicating a less concentrated market. (line chart below, left scale).

 

US Large Cap Equity Market Concentration

Chart illustrates the current historically high concentration of the US large cap equity market. Specifically it shows the Herfindahl Index and the total weight of the largest (in terms of market capitalization) seven companies in the Russell 1000 index. The chart shows both metrics are currently at their highest for the period from 1997 until present.

Source: FTSE Russell, November 2023. Past performance is no guarantee to future results. Please see the end for important disclosures.

As shown in the chart above, the index ranges from 100 to almost 150 in the more recent period from year 2020 and stayed above 110 for much of the period and reached the highest levels this year. The most recent concentration dominates the previous peak during the Dot Com Bubble,  where the index briefly exceeded 100 and declined after the Bubble burst. The period around the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 also saw elevated market concentration, but not as high as the two aforementioned periods.

Looking at the top seven company weights (area chart above, right scale), they are largely in line with the Herfindahl index and provide another metric showing the current market concentration being the highest during this century. The ‘Magnificent Seven’ accounted for 25.5% of the Russell 1000 Index vs. the long-term average of 15.5% for top 7 stocks during the period from 1998 through October of this year (see chart below). Even more striking, as the chart below shows, is the “Magnificent Seven”’s contribution to the Russell 1000 Index risk of 36% is even larger than their record weight.

"Magnificent Seven" - Total Weight vs. Percent of Risk

Chart 2 shows the current total weight of the ‘Magnificent Seven’ companies of 25.5% is significantly larger than 18.9% at the end of 2022 and the long-term average weight of the top seven stocks of 15.8%. Furthermore, the chart shows that the fraction of the Russell 1000 total risk accounted by the ‘Magnificent Seven’ is even higher at 35.7% and rising during 2023.

Source: FTSE Russell, November 2023. Past performance is no guarantee to future results. Please see the end for important disclosures,

Such extreme market concentration may be unsustainable and result in sharp reversal. Investors face a difficult choice between participating in extraordinary returns of the “Magnificent Seven”, should they continue, and avoiding the risks that come with an overly concentrated portfolio.

Looking at these Seven through style analysis as well as factor lens, they are essentially growth stocks in terms of style and quality in terms of factor. They are 100% in Russell 1000 Growth Index and high in quality score given high profitability and low leverage employed, e.g. in table below, Apple scores better than 98% of stocks in the Russell 1000 Index in terms of quality.

2023 2000
  Russell 1000 Weight R1000 Growth Probability Quality   Russell 1000 Weight R1000 Growth Probability Quality
Apple 6.95% 100% 98% GE 3.97% 100% 45%
Microsoft 6.22% 100% 90% Cisco 3.46% 100% 75%
Alphabet 3.39% 100% 92% Intel 3.42% 100% 74%
Amazon 2.91% 100% 59% Microsoft 2.40% 100% 51%
Nvidia 2.50% 100% 86% Exxon Mobil 2.09% 0% 77%
Tesla 1.77% 100% 88% IBM 1.49% 82% 33%
Meta 1.59% 100% 81% Lucent 1.45% 100% 28%

While history may not repeat itself, we looked at the Dot Com Bubble period that had the 2nd highest stock concentration to get an idea about sustainability of extraordinary performance. The top seven stocks then were GE, Cisco, Intel, Microsoft, ExxonMobil, IBM, and Lucent. In that case, all were growth stocks, except ExxonMobil, which was value. ExxonMobil, Cisco, Intel had the highest quality score and Lucent the lowest. After the Dot Com Bubble period, it was a tale of multiple stories. While Microsoft did not perform well until 2014 and now back in top seven, ExxonMobil has perfor,med well since then (especially with the recent surge in oil price). Lucent no longer exists.

Cumulative Return

Charts 3a and 3b show the performance of the largest seven stocks at the time of the Dot Com Bubble from 2000 until present. Two stocks, ExxonMobil and Microsoft had large positive cumulative returns, albeit concentrated in speicific periods, while the other 5 did not.

Source: FTSE Russell, November 2023. Past performance is no guarantee to future results. Please see the end for important disclosures.

As a meaning reverting story, overall, concentration of the previous top seven stocks has then come down from 20% to less than 10% (area chart, left scale in chart below). And Russell 1000 Value has outperformed Russell 1000 Growth after the Dot Com Bubble (line chart, right scale in chart below).

 

Largest 7 Stock Weight and Style Performance after the Dot Com Bubble

Chart 4 Shows concentration of the top seven stocks at year 2000 has then come down from 20% to less than 10%. It also shows Russell 1000 Value has outperformed Russell 1000 Growth after the Dot Com Bubble.

Source: FTSE Russell, November 2023. Past performance is no guarantee to future results. Please see the end for important disclosures.

Russell 1000 Value and Growth Indexes split the Russell 1000 into two distinct styles. They provide investment alternatives based on investor outlook for continuation of “Magnificent Seven” performance going forward. Chart below shows that the Seven currently reside entirely in the Russell 1000 Growth Index and account for almost 50% of its weight and 60% of its risk and are absent from the Russell 1000 Value Index.

"Magnificent Seven" - Total Weight vs. Percent of Risk 

Chart 5 Shows that “Magnificent Seven” currently reside entirely in the Russell 1000 Growth Index and account for almost 50% of its weight and 60% of its risk and are absent from the Russell 1000 Value Index.

Source: FTSE Russell, November 2023. Past performance is no guarantee to future results. Please see the end for important disclosures.

Furthermore, FTSE Russell has recently launched capped indexes to address concentration risks, which cover Russell 1000 Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) Indexes. Capped indexes limit weights of the “Magnificent Seven” in the ICB indexes. (Technology and Consumer Discretionary Indexes)

With the US stock market currently experiencing the highest market concentration in recent history, with the Seven comprising over 25% of market cap weight, 36% of risk, and 94% of Russell 1000 return YTD as of October 2023, they have been fixtures in headline news. Investors and financial product providers have been questioning the implications of market concentration on investment outcome. Growth/Value Style Indexes and capped indexes offer investment participants the tools to express their view on the future of the Seven while maintaining equity exposures.

To learn more about our Russell Indices go to Russell 1000 ICB Industry Capped Indices.

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